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ABSTRACT: This paper analyses two definitions of contingency. Both definitions have 
been widely accepted and used as to identify contingent events. One of them is pri-
marily of a philosophical character, whereas the other is more commonly used in 
mathematics. Evidently, these two definitions do not describe the same set of phe-
nomena, and neither of them determines the completely intuitive notion of con-
tingency. Namely, carefully selected examples testify that the first definition is too 
narrow and the second too wide. These facts have certain epistemological conse-
quences. They must, therefore, serve as a warning for using the definitions only in 
a restrictive and cautious way when detecting random beliefs – those we cannot 
identify as knowledge.
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1. Introductory remarks
Each scholarly discipline has a certain conceptual apparatus, a number of 
terms that are used as theory-making tools. Since it is natural to expect de-
ductive correctness in the construction of theory, each of these terms would 
have to be defined by using the other, already defined terms, or terms that 
will in a sense be considered as clear and comprehensible without the need to 
be further determined.
A number of terms belong exclusively to certain scholarly fields, while 
most of other terms shall be used and interpreted in not just one area. The 
concept of contiguity or a random event belongs to the second group of 
terms. For example, this term is frequently utilised in mathematics and phys-
ics, but also in philosophy and psychology. The fact is, however, that only 
sometimes in the areas of philosophy and mathematics, as opposed to other 
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scholarly fields and the lay everyday usage of the term, it is not used as abso-
lutely obvious. Instead, attempts are made at explaining this term and mak-
ing it comprehensible by means of other terms. This paper is another modest 
attempt at this.1
The concept of coincidence can, then, be viewed from different perspec-
tives: mathematical, philosophical, physical or psychological, for example. 
It is natural that the selection of the point of view determines the approach 
itself. We could say that the angle from which this paper analyzes the notion 
of contingency is philosophical and mathematical. More specifically, the con-
cept of contingency will be addressed in the epistemic context. Once we have 
proposed two definitions of contingency, we will be interested to know how 
much they are useful in connection with the concept of knowledge. Why 
connect these two concepts exactly? Although there are different views of 
the concept of knowledge in the modern literature, this article was inspired, 
among others, by the thought of Duncan Prichard and his views of the so 
called anti-luck epistemology. He notes that the role of the concepts of con-
tingency and luck in terms of the concepts of knowledge is very complex. In 
fact, on the one hand,
[a] common intuition often expressed regarding knowledge is that it is true 
belief that has been formed in a non-lucky or non-accidental fashion. Indeed, 
this is often thought to be the proper moral to be drawn from the Gettier coun-
terexamples to the classical tripartite account of knowledge – that the classical 
account left knowledge possession unduly exposed to the vagaries of luck. It is 
not difficult to see the attraction of such a view, since knowledge is clearly a cog-
nitive achievement of some sort and cognitive achievements are not naturally of 
as being due (either in whole or part) to serendipity.2
And on the other,
Nevertheless, this cannot be the full story because it does seem that all knowl-
edge must be, to some degree, dependent upon luck. After all, knowledge in-
volves a kind of union of agent and world, and thus is ineliminably dependent 
upon the co-operation of that world.3
This author distinguishes between several types of luck-accident, noting 
the fact that some of them are “compatible” with knowledge and do not ques-
tion it, while the appearance of others excludes speaking about knowledge.
Encouraged by the previous considerations, we will try to do the follow-
ing: we will propose two definitions of the term “contingency”, one of which 
1 A large number of authors feel there is no need to define this term in philosophical dis-
cussions. Such are, for instance, Gjelsvik (1991), Hall (1994), Heller (1999), Vahid (2001).
2 Pritchard (2004: 193).
3 Pritchard (2004: 194).
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will be fully formalized and represented mathematically, the way it is normally 
done in the theory of probability. Then, we will analyze their relationship and 
their (in)compatibility with the concept of knowledge. We will be interested 
to know what the relationship is between sets of the phenomena that the 
two definitions describe, that is, whether these sets are potentially equal, or 
they may have at least some common elements, or are, however, disjoint. At 
the same time, by using the relevant examples, we will also try to observe to 
what extent each of these definitions corresponds to our “pre-philosophical” 
understanding of the concept of contingency. Based on this, we will finally 
try to draw a conclusion as to whether and how these definitions can be used 
as tools for identification of contingently truthful beliefs, those that we can 
classify as knowledge.
2. Two definitions of contingency
Let’s try to analyze the concept of a contingent event. What is most often 
demanded from such an event is that it is under a control or “conduction” of 
some sort or other which is driven by one’s intention or will.4 If such a control 
was present, it would be clear that, with regard to our intuitive understanding 
of the concept of contingency5, we could not speak of a contingent event, 
because its outcome is in a way determined by the intentions and actions of 
some entity. Let us take a few typical examples of events that are considered 
to be contingent, which would satisfy the previous condition.
4 Pritchard (2005: 127).
5 At this point it is necessary to give a formal-logical explanation. This paper is an at-
tempt of defining the concept of contingency. Defining a concept is a process of a more 
precise explanation of the term by means of the terms that have already been defined or are 
in a sense clearer than the new term. On the other hand, the effort to define a term also im-
plies that we do not have its precise terminological and conceptual clarification. Still, what is 
a useful defining step is some sort of an intuitive idea of  what we understand by that term. 
When we say “intuitive idea”, we think of an idea that has not necessarily been translated into 
a precise formal definition. Thus, it is clear that the notion of intuitive idea does not imply 
the existence of its precise definition. Let us explain this by an analogous situation we have in 
mathematics. For example, according to one of several existing axioms of Euclidean geometry, 
the concepts of point, line and plane are considered as basic terms. This means that they feel 
intuitively clear, so we do not need to define them. A mathematician may say that these are 
clear terms, though he will not be able to tell us much about them. Using these and some 
derived concepts we could define, for example, the concept of a circle, of which we also have 
an intuitive idea, but whose formalized and ready-to-use idea we can have only after creating a 
potential definition. When we propose a definition of the circle, we are able to talk about how 
it fits our intuitive idea of this concept, although we do not say anything about the concept 
itself. Specifically, the very attempt at describing the idea would be an attempt at defining it. 
In the same manner we will proceed in this paper when speaking about the intuitive idea of 
contingency.
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Example 1. Walking down the street I found a 10-Euro note.
Example 2. On the New Year’s lottery my number was drawn as the 
jackpot.
Example 3. Flipping a coin, I got tails.
Among other things, indeed, all three cases have one thing in common; 
the final outcome of neither of them is affected by a subject’s will. In the first 
example I found the note, but at the same time, neither I nor anyone else 
has “wished” for something like that to happen. No one’s hidden intention is 
behind it. In another example, I am a lottery winner and no one has willingly 
contributed to the fact that exactly my lottery ticket was drawn. Finally, in 
the case of a coin toss, which is often cited in the theory of probability as a 
typical example of an accidental event, no one’s desire or control has affected 
the result of the throw as to be exactly tails.
Once we have realized that the absence of one’s control and “directing” 
of the outcome of the event should be a necessary condition for an accident, 
it is natural to wonder about the sufficiency of such conditions. The question 
is whether it is possible to find examples of events which will meet this condi-
tion, about which, nevertheless, we will not be inclined to talk as about con-
tingent event. Take the example of the next day’s event of sunrise. If we accept 
that this is an event which happens without control and is unaffected by the 
will of any subject, we should in accordance with the proposed conditions 
state that it is a contingent event. This, however, will not be easily said of the 
event of sunrise. We will also face problems when acquiring certain percep-
tual knowledge. When we talk about the knowledge that, according to the 
traditional interpretation involves a belief, we already take certain reasons for 
granted, a justification for this belief, therefore, the absence of a contingent, 
reasonable and random belief. However, there are different perceptual beliefs 
and types of knowledge which are often acquired outside of any control and 
intentions of the subject. If we define a contingent event by means of lack of 
any sort of or anyone’s control, we would not allow a significant number of 
perceptual beliefs to become knowledge, which is not an acceptable result.
A significant attempt at defining contingent events is the one that in-
volves the use of the concept of possible worlds.6 In fact, by using this con-
6 Theorists who use the concept of possible worlds consider the actual world, the world 
in which we live, as one of the possible worlds. Amongst the authors who use the term, there 
are disagreements about the nature of possible worlds. Their ontological status is not clear, par-
ticularly the existence of differences, if any, between the ontological status of the actual world 
and other possible worlds. The very idea can be traced back to Leibniz (2006), in the context 
of proving that God created our world as the best of all possible worlds. Contemporary authors 
who introduced the concept to the modal context are Kripke and Lewis. In this sense, the link 
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cept, we can say that an event is contingent if it occurs in our real world, but 
does not occur in the general class of the nearest possible worlds in which the 
relevant initial conditions for that event are the same as in our world.7 Let 
us, for easier further reference, denote this definition by D1. To examine 
the appropriateness of the proposed definition, it is necessary to make a few 
preliminary clarifications.
When we speak about the relevant initial conditions, we refer to those 
conditions that do not directly determine the occurrence of the event itself, 
but are assumed regardless of whether the event occurred or not. In the first 
example, such conditions would be: making the decision to take a walk, the 
lack of any kind of suggestions and hints to the man who walks where he 
“ought to” take the walk, of what could be found in the street, etc. In the sec-
ond example, such conditions would be: buying a lottery ticket, the fair or-
ganization of the draw without any rigging or fraud, inserting a ball into the 
machine under special circumstances that do not place it in “advantage” over 
others, and so on. In the third example such conditions would be: flipping 
the coin without any special control (for example, attempting to affect the 
outcome by shorter throws or fewer revolutions of the coin), the approximate 
uniformity in the distribution of mass on both sides of the coin, etc.
Now let’s explain what we mean by the phrase broad class of the proposed 
definition. When you play the lottery, in almost all other nearby worlds, you 
will not get the jackpot. This means that there are many more close worlds 
in which the described event, under the same relevant initial conditions, will 
not happen, that is it will not appear in a larger, wider class of close worlds. 
This sort of condition seems natural if we want to talk about trying to define 
the concept of a contingent event, because if the event appears in the majority 
of close worlds, then the question is whether following our intuition we could 
consider such an event a contingent one. However, following the mathemati-
cal manner, it is natural to ask where the limit is of a class which we consider 
to be a wider class. Let us explain the motivation for the previous question by 
one example. Let’s imagine a quiz show participant who randomly chooses 
one of the two offered answers to a question, of which one is correct whereas 
the other is false. He will lose (gain) in approximately half of close possible 
worlds. However, if he has to choose one out of five-choice answers, of which 
three are correct and two are false, although it is a random choice, he will get 
the correct option in a greater number of close possible worlds. Our intention 
was to detect the events that do not occur in most close possible worlds by 
between the question of determining the accuracy of modal statements (the possible, necessary 
ones) and the idea of possible worlds are being discussed. We will use this term for description 
of events which occur in our world which, mathematically speaking, are likely to occur.
7 Pritchard (2005: 128).
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means of the last definition of contingency, which means that the selection of 
a correct response, regardless of the randomness in the last example, we could 
not consider a “complete” coincidence.8 It might naturally be expected that 
at least half of the times an event is realised in such a way that it is impossible 
to give it the status of a contingent one, and this sort of limitation could be 
motivated exactly by the example of a coin toss.
Let us consider how in accordance with definition D1 we can observe 
previously mentioned characteristic examples. When it comes to the first 
example, in the majority of cases, and therefore in the wider class of close 
possible worlds, walking down the street we will not find a 10-Euro bill, so 
in this case the definition of contingency is appropriate. Looking at the sec-
ond example, it is clear that in majority of cases, which means in the wider 
class of close possible worlds, playing the New Year’s lottery we will not get 
the prize. Finally, when tossing a coin, the number of cases in which we got 
tails, will approximately9 be the same as the number of cases in which we 
got heads. Also, in accordance with the proposed definition, the sunrise case 
will not be seen as a contingent event, as in all close possible worlds and 
therefore in the wider class of close possible worlds the event of sunrise will 
occur.10
Let us now see how the concept of contingent events can be defined in 
mathematics. Namely, the basic model in the theory of probability is experi-
ment (phenomenon) in which the realisation of certain conditions does not 
lead to the unequivocal (deterministic) result.
Example 4. A roll of the dice. In this experiment the conditions are 
“throwing the dice” and the result is “the number of points displayed on the 
upper side of the dice once it is rolled”.
The set of all possible outcomes of the experiment we will mark by Ω. Its 
elements (individual, possible outcomes) we can name elementary events. We 
can mark them by ω. When describing an experiment, in addition to specify-
ing the conditions, it is necessary to thoroughly explain what is observed as 
its result.
Example 5. We flip a coin five times and record the number of times we 
got tails. In this case, Ω = {0,1,2,3,4,5}. Possible elementary outcomes are the 
numbers zero to five.
 8 We could possibly state that this case is “less” contingent than others.
 9 As the number of throws increases, the ratio of the cases in which we get tails (heads) 
and the total number of throws tends to 0,5.
10 The exception would be a close world in which, for example, there was a cosmic catas-
trophe that would disrupt the movement of certain celestial bodies within the solar system.
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Now we can define the (contingent) event A as an arbitrary subset of the 
set Ω.11 This definition of contingent events we can denote by D2. We will 
say that an event A is realized if and only if it achieved an outcome ω which 
is an element of the set A.
Example 4a. Assuming the conditions from example 4 are satisfied, we ob-
tain that Ω = {1,2,3,4,5,6}. Consider, for example, the event B, where B = {3,6}, 
that the number of points obtained by throwing the dice will be divisible by 3.
Example 5a. Assuming the conditions from example 5 are met, we can 
observe, for example, the event C = {4,5}, that tails appear more than three 
times.
According to definition D2, Ω is too a contingent event12, and one that 
is always realized, and it can be considered to be a certain or secure event. In 
our example 5, this would be the event in which tails appear 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 
5 times in a total of five coin flips. On the other hand, the empty set Ø, as 
a subset of every set, including the set Ω, we would consider an impossible 
event. In our example, this would be an event in which after flipping the coin 
five times, we do not get tails neither 0 or 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 times.
Earlier we saw that in the first three examples, contingent events were 
described according to definition D1. The same can be said of the examples 
4a and 5a. Indeed, in the majority of close possible worlds it would not 
happen that when rolling the dice once we get a number that is divisible 
by three, nor will it happen that when flipping a coin five times we get the 
tails on more than three occasions. Let’s look at how things stand with the 
mathematical definition of D2. Examples 4a and 5a represent random events 
which are presented to illustrate how definition D2 works. How do things 
stand with the first three examples? Can we “fit” them too into the terms of 
the definition D2, that is, can we accurately determine their objects – a set Ω 
and some of its subsets A, B or C which were determined by the definition?
Let’s start with example 3, in which a coin is tossed once and we get tails. 
Here, Ω = {tails, heads}, and the event A = {tails}. Therefore, formal requirements 
of definition D2 have been satisfied, so we can say that it is also an example of a 
contingent event. In Example 2, in which my ticket was drawn as the jackpot on 
New Year’s lottery, in a similar way, we can identify the sets Ω and A.
In this case, the set Ω is the set of all ticket numbers that were sold by 
the New Year’s lottery13, and A is a single-element set whose only element is 
my ticket number. So, recognizing the terms of the definition D2, in accord-
11 Ivković (1980: 9).
12 Each set is its own subset.
13 In this example we take that the lottery was organized in such a manner that the jack-
pot had to be drawn, i.e. that it could not happen that the unsold ticket number was drawn.
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ance with it, we can say that by giving the example 2 we have illustrated a 
contingent event. Is it so with example 1?
What can possibly complicate the answer to the previous question is the 
process of determining the set Ω. If we have determined the set, we could 
easily determine its arbitrary subset, that is, a random event and elementary 
events ω as elements of the set Ω. Example 1 is different from the other 
examples in that it is not “strictly” standardized in relation to the initial 
conditions that occur in it. The remaining examples are typical examples of 
mathematical contingent events, for which it is possible to very accurately 
determine the relevant initial conditions. The nature of these events does not 
allow too much variation in relation to the initial conditions that appear in 
them (registration of the number of points on top of the dice, determining 
the outcome of the flipped coin, specifying how many times certain side of a 
repeatedly thrown coin has occurred, checking the geometric regularity of the 
dice and the coin which are being used, the draw of balls on the New Year’s 
lottery, their equality in weight and shape, etc.).
In such standardized experiments it is not particularly difficult to deter-
mine the set of all possible outcomes. In fact, when describing the random 
event of finding banknotes, it is not clear what in this case is the “experiment” 
and what its possible outcomes, which is a necessary thing to do if we want 
to make sure that the described event can be included under definition D2. 
However, it seems that with a little more detail and precision in the formula-
tion of examples, this too would be possible. In this sense, let us make a pos-
sible illustration. For example, we could say that the initial conditions in this 
example assume that I am going for a walk at a specific time and along the 
specific streets, without any indication as to whether I can find something on 
the way. In other words, the experiment would be an individual’s trip along a 
specified itinerary, during which the person has no idea whether he/she could 
find anything. What are the results of such an experiment which are reasona-
ble to expect, given the outcome described in Example 1? One and at the same 
time the most trivial possibility14 of setting up the set Ω is the one in which we 
would consider two possible disjunctive outcomes15: to find a 10-Euro note 
14 There is an infinite number of ways in which we can describe this event as a result of 
a certain experiment, and this depends on how we will determine the set Ω. For instance, we 
could say that Ω = {finding a 10-Euro note, finding a lost ID, finding a lost ring, not finding 
any of these}, or Ω = {finding a 10-Euro note, finding a 20-Euro note, finding a 50-Euro note, 
not finding any of the given bank notes}, etc. It is important that the set Ω has to exhaust by 
its elements the set of all possibilities which are the likely results of the experiment. 
15 The terminology used here is related primarily to the set theory. Two sets are consid-
ered to be disjoint if their intersection is an empty set. In the domain of logic in this situation 
we can use an equivalent exclusive disjunction which does not allow both of the elements to 
be accurate.
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while walking and not to find a 10-Euro note while walking. This is how we 
found a way to describe the event from Example 1 as a result of the relevant 
experiment, in which the set Ω is a two-item set, and the contingent event 
described in the example is one of its subsets. Thus, we have simultaneously 
shown that random events, such as, for example, is the one described in Ex-
ample 1, which, perhaps, are not typical examples of mathematical random 
events, can, by acquiring appropriate details, still be given in this form and 
can be considered analogously as any typical example of a random event from 
the theory of probability.
It would be natural to consider the relationship between definitions D1 
and D2, and in connection with the question which one is more appropriate 
for what we intuitively consider a contingent event.16 The main difference 
that is immediately noted in the above remarks is that the set of contingent 
events S1 which falls under the definition D1 is not the same as the set of 
contingent events S2 determined by the definition D2. More specifically, S1 
is a real subset of S2. Indeed, all contingent events, as defined by definition 
D1, are events that would never happen in the broader class of worlds that are 
close to ours. All these events, even if they are not given in a precise formal 
way (accurately described experiment, the initial conditions, the complete set 
of outcomes) can, as we have seen in the example, be presented in such a way 
as to allow us to consider them contingent according to definition D2. On 
the other hand, all contingent events, as defined by definition D2, we can 
consider contingent according to definition D1. In order to explain this, we 
offer the following illustration:
Example 6. Assuming the conditions of Example 4 have been met, we 
have Ω = {1,2,3,4,5,6}. Let us consider the event C = {1,2,3,4,5} that the 
number of points obtained by rolling the dice once will be smaller than 6.
Event C in the example above is random according to the definition D2, 
because it meets all the formal conditions required by the definition. On the 
other hand, C cannot be considered a random event according to definition 
D1 because it is not true that it will not occur in a wider class of close pos-
sible worlds. On the contrary, it is highly unlikely that it will not happen in 
a world that is close to our own. In this way we have shown that there is a 
relationship of strict inclusion between the sets S1 and S2.
Since we have seen that the two definitions do not define the same set of 
cases, it would be natural to ask ourselves which definition to choose in order 
16 We will here ignore the fact that definitions D1 and D2, by their form, application 
and the nature of the notions they utilize, belong, conditionally speaking, to different scholarly 
areas (D1 belongs to philosophy, whereas D2 belongs to mathematics). We will, first of all, be 
interested in the types of events which are determined by them.
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to define the concept of contingent events. We will not make this judgement 
simply by considering the definitions and the space of contingent events that 
each of them determines. We will say that event C in the last example is 
contingent according to the definition D2, although it will not be marked as 
such on the basis of definition D1.
On the other hand, the idea of  defining the notion of contingency by 
means of the notion of close possible worlds also seems natural. The question 
of acceptance of the definition we can set a little differently, in what seems to 
be a clearer form. Since everything that we accept as a contingent event ac-
cording to definition D1 we can present in such a way as to accept it as a ran-
dom event according to definition D2 as well, while the reverse is not true, 
we only need to decide whether all the random events as defined by defini-
tion D2 are forms of contingency as we intuitively, at least functionally, un-
derstand them within a given theory. We will try to make a judgement about 
this by observing an important epistemological context of contingency – the 
existence of knowledge implies the absence of an accidentally true belief.
3. Two Definitions of Contingency and Knowledge
It is widely accepted among epistemologists that a belief, even if true, cannot 
be understood as knowledge if we obtained it due to pure chance. In order 
to prevent such beliefs as candidates for knowledge, we introduce different 
conditions related to the acquired beliefs, such as requirements for truthful 
beliefs, their sensitivity to changes that may occur in connection with the sub-
ject of belief, and so on. The majority of epistemologists have focused their 
attention exactly on the specific technical requirements that would exclude 
consideration of beliefs whose truthfulness has been obtained by accident. 
These conditions are not the focus of our attention, but we focus on the ques-
tion of defining the concept of contingency which is important for the defi-
nition of knowledge. We have considered two options of this determination 
above. The decision on whether it is appropriate to accept the formulation 
D1 or D2 as a definition of contingency (randomness) we will bring precisely 
within the epistemological framework of the concept of contingency. To be 
more precise, as previously mentioned, D1 is a variant definition which has 
already been proposed within this framework in a relevant way. D1 has al-
ready been accepted and is well-established as a possible definition within 
the epistemological framework of the concept of contingency, and this is 
nothing new. What would be interesting is to check whether D2 as well can 
be seen in these terms. If the answer to the previous question was positive, 
it would not necessarily mean that D2 is more appropriate than D1 in the 
theory of knowledge, but it would certainly mean that D1 is too narrow and 
inadequate. This is exactly what we are going to illustrate further on. In order 
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to do this, it is enough to give an example which is a contingent event accord-
ing to definition D2, but which is not contingent based on D1 and which 
will intuitively “undermine” knowledge. In this way we will show that when 
it comes to knowledge, the more formal definition D2 may in some cases be 
taken as a basis for identification of contingency, even before definition D1.
Gettier’s (1963) examples, as well as all the subsequent Gettier-style ex-
amples were created with the aim to show that the traditional tripartite defi-
nition of knowledge, as a justified true belief, is not adequate. They provide 
the cases of beliefs that are in some sense justified and therefore true, but for 
which intuitively we would not say that they represent knowledge. What 
we call intuitive and understand as contingent is used in their construction. 
Recall, for example, the second Gettier’s example.
Let’s suppose that Smith has a good reason to believe the truthfulness of 
the following statement:
p: Jones is an owner of a Ford.
The reason is based on the fact that Smith has got evidence which proves 
that Jones had a Ford and that he recently offered him a ride. Smith has a 
friend whose name is Brown. The utterance p entails
q: Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
Based on the two Gettier’s assumptions, Smith has full right to believe q. 
Smith, however, does not have adequate information on the whereabouts of 
Brown. Let’s imagine that Jones is the owner of a Ford, and that Brown is, in-
deed, in Barcelona. q is true, Smith believes that q is a true statement, and his 
belief is justified. However, this is not knowledge, says Gettier and concludes: 
we can have a justified true belief which is not knowledge, and therefore the 
traditional definition is inadequate.
At this point we are not interested in the role of the example as a means 
of discrediting a traditional definition. What is important to us is the role of 
contingency of events, or more precisely, a contingency of truthfulness of a 
statement as regards a specific event, in the last example with respect to the 
definitions D1 and D2. Probably it would be difficult to say that Brown is 
in Barcelona by accident, but we will still say that Smith’s believing the state-
ment q is accidentally true. Of course, there are probably specific reasons why 
Brown was in that city, 17 so from his perspective, we could not say that he 
found himself there randomly. However, from Smith’s perspective who can 
only guess where Brown is since he has no information about his wherea-
bouts, the truth of the utterance q is purely coincidental.
17 For tourism, business, health reasons, etc.
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Let’s see if the veracity of q can be understood as a contingent event ac-
cording to the two definitions.
According to D1, the truth of q would be, of course, a contingent event. 
In fact, in most of the worlds which are close to our own, the truth of q 
cannot be realised  because Smith chose Barcelona without any information 
about where Brown really is. In the majority of worlds which are close to our 
own, that statement would be false, because there is a very small chance that 
a randomly selected city would be the same one as the city in which Brown 
is actually located.
In the general discussion on the contingent events, we previously showed 
that every contingent event explained in the spirit of definition D1, with 
appropriate formal refinement we can also understand as a contingency ac-
cording to D2. Let us show that when it comes to the contingency in the 
context of knowledge it is no different. To see whether the veracity of q is 
a contingent event according to D2 as well, it is necessary to describe the 
event in accordance with this definition, that is, to describe the experiment, 
its terms, the set Ω and to see if the event in question can be described as a 
subset of Ω. We examine the veracity of Smith’s statement q by means of an 
experiment. In addition, when producing the utterance, Smith has no clue as 
to where Brown could be located. When producing the utterance, Smith can 
choose any city in the world and Brown is a person who often travels and is 
rarely found in the city where he, otherwise, lives. So in this case we have the 
following situation:
Ω = {“true”, “false”}.
If we denote by A the fact that the utterance q is true, than we have that
A = {“true”},
by which we confirm the earlier consideration that every contingent event as 
defined by definition D1, even the one from the second Gettier’s example, 
can be viewed as contingent according to definition D2.
Also, in an earlier general review of contingency we have seen that there 
are contingent events according to D2, which, however, are not contingent 
according to D1. For us, the important question is whether such an exam-
ple can be found when speaking about contingent events in the context of 
knowledge. If the answer to that question was yes, then it would mean that 
D2 can also, perhaps by introducing to it appropriate additional conditions, 
be used as a means for recognizing contingency in the context of knowledge. 
It would also mean that D1 does not recognize all forms of contingency 
which exist in relation to knowledge. In order to show that this is the case, 
let’s consider the already mentioned, but somewhat changed second example 
of Gettier’s.
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Let’s suppose that Smith again has a good reason to believe the truth of 
the following statement:
p: Jones is an owner of a Ford.
The reason is based, as before, on the fact that Smith has evidence which 
proves that Jones had previously had a Ford that he recently offered him a 
ride. Smith also has a friend Brown. The utterance p entails the utterance
q: Jones owns a Ford or Brown is the father of fewer than four children.
Smith has information that Brown is a father, that the birth rate in their 
area is low, that very few couples in their country have more than three chil-
dren, the small family tradition was followed by Brown’s parents and his wife’s 
parents, but there is no precise information on how many children Brown, 
in fact, has. Imagine that Jones is the owner of the Ford, and Brown is the 
father of two children. q is true, Smith believes that q is true and his belief is 
justified.
Let’s see if the truth of q is a contingent event. According to D1, we can-
not say this is the case because in the majority of close worlds that statement 
would also be true, that is, the event would be realized. In this case, when we 
say close worlds, we think of the worlds in which Smith has similar informa-
tion about Brown in connection with his family situation, family traditions 
as regards the number of children people have, as well as information on the 
average birth rate in their area.
In order to possibly determine that this is a contingent event according 
to D2, it is necessary to, as we did before, describe the event in accordance 
with this definition, that is, to describe the experiment, its terms, the set Ω 
and the corresponding event. We examine the veracity of Smith’s statement 
q by means of an experiment. In addition to this, when Smith states the ut-
terance, he has no clue as to whether Brown has got children. When uttering 
the statement, Smith can choose any natural number, or any subset of natural 
numbers.18 So in this case we have that
Ω = {“true”, “false”}.
If we denote by B the fact that the statement q is true, then we have that
B = {“true”},
by which we have proved that the truth (falsity) of the utterance q we can 
regard as a contingent event according to definition D2.
So, by providing the last example we have found a contingent event 
which is contingent according to D2, but which cannot be considered so 
18 He can state: “Brown has got two children”, or “Brown has got more than four chil-
dren”, etc.
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based on D1. It remains to be seen whether we can say that such an event 
“undermines” knowledge.19 Can we say that Smith, whose statement q is 
true, knows that Brown has fewer than four children? His testimony is very 
likely to be true, given the relevant information that he owns, but intuitively, 
it would be very difficult for us to say that he knows something about the 
numerical state of Brown’s family. One could rather say that his statement q 
is guesswork which is very likely to be true.20
What did we show by the previous example? We found an event that, 
intuitively, we consider being contingent, and that it is such according to D2 
but not according to D1. This means that the definition of contingency by 
means of the notion of close worlds is too narrow, that is, the events that we 
intuitively see as contingent cannot all fall under this definition. We have 
demonstrated that the quoted event can be considered as contingent accord-
ing to D2, which is what is expected from a definition of contingency. Of 
course, what we have just said does not allow us to say that D2 is the right 
definition. We can say this if we determine that it is not too narrow or too 
loose, i.e. that there are no intuitively random events that cannot be sub-
sumed under D2, and that there are no examples of events for which we will 
intuitively not say that are contingent, but which, however, still fall under 
this class by D2.
The first condition that we have illustrated by the above examples has 
always been there, i.e. definition D2 meets this condition. Indeed, whenever 
we have an appropriate event whose outcome is not absolutely determined, 
we can talk about the description of the event, circumstances under which 
it happens as well as possible outcomes. These are precisely the formal pre-
requisites for proclaiming something as a random event according to D2. 
However, it is uncertain whether definition D2 meets the above mentioned 
second condition. To be more precise, we can certainly come up with certain 
events which intuitively we cannot consider contingent, but they will still 
be contingent according to D2. How can we be sure of something like that 
before finding an example of it? Relying on D2, we will consider that a con-
tingent event is any set A, which is a subset of the set of all elementary out-
comes Ω. It is, at the same time, theoretically possible that the set Ω is “very 
large”, infinite and even uncountable21 and that the set A is described as, for 
19 We will consider knowledge a justified true belief, as determined by the so called 
traditional definition.
20 A change in the subject of belief, i.e. the number of Brown’s children (let’s suppose he 
has just got twins) would not in any way affect Smith’s belief and the validity of his utterance 
having in mind the available information he has based it on. 
21 We will state that an infinite set is uncountable (i.e. it is of larger cardinality than 
the set of natural numbers N), if there is no bijection between that set and the set of natural 
numbers. Such is, for instance, the set of real numbers R.
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example, the singleton, subset of Ω. For our purposes, the event B = Ac would 
be an interesting one, the complement of A, that is, the event – a set which 
is disjoint from the set A, and which in a union with the set A gives a set of 
elementary outcomes Ω. In this case, the probability of occurrence of an ac-
cidental event A would be rather low, close to a zero, while the probability of 
occurrence of an accidental event B would be very high, close to one.
Let us illustrate the above with two examples. Let the experiment con-
sist of a random selection of balls, numbered 1 through 100, from a lotto 
machine. After the selection, we record the result as an exact number of the 
selected balls. The set Ω is in this case a set of natural numbers on a scale of 
1 to 100. Let A be the event of selecting a particular number, for example, 
the number 4, and let B = Ac, the event that we have not selected the number 
4. The probability that B will be realised is 0.99 and something like that we 
cannot intuitively understand as a contingent event. Or let us take even a 
more extreme example. Let the experiment consist of a random selection of 
points from the interval (0,1) on a real line. After the selection, we register 
the result as a specific number from the interval. The set Ω in this case is an 
infinite, uncountable set that has the same number of elements as the whole 
real line. Let A be the event of selecting a particular number, for example, the 
number 0,37, and let B = Ac, the event that we have chosen a number which 
is not 0,37. Likelihood that B will be achieved is 1, that is, we can say that 
the event will certainly come true, which we particularly cannot intuitively 
consider a random event.
Let’s summarize the above. We have shown that definition D1 is too 
narrow because we have been able to find examples which intuitively we can 
understand as contingent events, but not according to this definition. Such 
examples, with certain adjustments, we can understand as descriptions of 
random events as defined by D2. However, we have seen too that there are 
examples which were described as contingent by D2, but we, intuitively, are 
not able to accept them as such. In other words, definition D2 is too wide 
and it too is not adequate.
Previous considerations naturally open a final question. Namely, can 
definitions D1 and D2 be appropriately adapted so that they are completely 
relevant when talking about the notion of contingency in the context of the 
concept of knowledge or is their “falsity” hidden in their very design and idea, 
without any hope that improvement can be made? In our article, we thus 
focus on definition D2.
The main objection that we specified in connection to definition D2 
was linked to a range of events that we have, based on it, considered to be 
contingent. To be more precise, the definition was too broad. It allowed us to 
mark as contingent even those events the achievement of which was highly 
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probable, such as event B in the last two examples. Inspired by the prob-
lems that we have encountered in relation to these examples, we can look at 
whether some details in definition D2 could be changed, supplemented or 
specified as to make the definition more appropriate. At the same time, we 
must avoid the danger that often lurks in these situations. We have to avoid 
an ad hoc change of the definition which would solve the problem related to 
the specific examples or classes of examples that have inspired us to change, 
but which would not solve the difficulties associated with a number of other 
examples, or even create new difficulties in connection with the examples 
which had no problems prior to the change of the definition.
As noted above, what does not allow us to accept events such as event B 
in the last two examples as contingent, is that they display probability which is 
close to one, or is exactly one. The discussion, of course, no longer refers only 
to the aforementioned events, but all events whose probability is expressed in 
large values. In this sense, we should think about the possible adjustment of D2. 
The task should be reduced to the following: can definition D2 be changed in 
such a way that it does not cover the events which have a high likelihood of be-
ing achieved? The task that stands before us is a difficult one. Namely, in order 
to answer this question we would have to determine what “high” probability 
is. Are these only the events whose probability is close to one? What measure is 
to be used and how to express the closeness to number one?
The standard example of the coin toss has, perhaps, partially motivated 
us to give answers to the above questions. Once we have flipped a coin the 
probability of getting tails is 0,5. This is an example of an event that is typi-
cally considered contingent. Its probability is a number that is equidistant 
from both the values zero and one. If the number was closer to zero than to 
one, the event would still intuitively be understood as contingent, as some-
thing that does not happen for certain, but under special, extraordinary cir-
cumstances. If the number was closer to one than to zero, its understanding 
as a contingent event would be brought into question, to the extent to which 
the value was closer to the number 1. That is, if we think that the possibility 
that an event will happen is higher rather than it not happening, intuitively, 
we could not easily say that such an event is contingent. So, maybe someone 
would suggest that the bordering value for determining the status of an in-
tuitively contingent event that would be relevant in the context of knowledge 
should be the likelihood of 0,5. However, we would not allow then some of 
the events to be contingent, although we consider them as such.
The principal problem with the mathematical definition D2 is that ac-
cording to it we will consider all the events contingent, no matter how high 
their probability is or whether it is close to one. A mathematician will, regard-
less of the criticism, offer his intuition regarding the status of a contingent 
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event in this situation as well. He will simply say that although the probability 
of event A is very high, he considers the probability of occurrence of event A 
or its complement possibility of it not occurring, thus putting aside the size of 
the likely alternatives. Pursuant to such an intuition, we can say that neither 
the realization of event A nor achievement of its complement is determined 
or predetermined by anything. There is a possibility that both events will be 
achieved. The probability rate of either event does not give us the right to 
declare one of them as more contingent than the other. Both events are con-
tingent, although they have different probability. The realisation of certain 
events can be graded according to the likelihood of their occurrence, but that 
does not mean that we will consider one of them as more or less contingent. 
A mathematician will thus finish his explanation. Any attempt at changing 
the definition D2 by which we would try to preserve the “non-mathematic” 
intuition about contingency, essential to the concept of knowledge, would 
upset the whole basic mathematical idea of  a contingent event as a non-deter-
ministic outcome, that is, formally expressed, as a kind of a collection of basic 
elements that are selected from a set of all possibilities. On the other hand, if 
we accept the idea presented by D2, we would also think that a contingent 
event is the realization of the event of selecting a white ball out of a machine 
containing 999 blue and one white, which also will not be easy to accept.
The final and the most commonplace attempt at “improving” D2 as we 
have just indicated, would be to limit the probability of occurrence in D2 by 
selecting a constant from an interval (0,1), for example the value of 0,5 or 
some other value which is close to that one. So, following this idea, we would 
consider that an event is contingent if its probability is smaller than a fixed 
constant from the interval (0,1). Only then would we run into problems and 
see how powerful a mathematical idea of  contingency is. In fact, if we chose, 
for example, the constant of 0,5, then we would not consider, for instance, that 
the statement of the aforementioned converted second Gettier’s example22 was 
accidentally true, as well as a number of other events that we can construct and 
that we would intuitively accept as contingent. The selection of any of the con-
stants from the interval (0,1) as a boundary that would determine the status of 
contingency would inevitably pose the question to which we cannot give rea-
sonable/justified answers: why was precisely this constant chosen, and not any 
other, and can we guarantee that one cannot construct an example which will 
portray an event that can be intuitively considered as accidental, and whose 
probability of realization would be greater than the selected constant?
22 Providing the exact statistical data on the country’s natality, the data on the number 
of members of Brown’s parents’ family and his wife’s parents’ family, as well as many other 
important details that can affect the number of family members, we could speak of a concrete 
probability, in this case, which would surely be higher than 0,5. 
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Definition D1 carries a natural and expected idea that we should consider 
as contingent all those events that will happen quite rarely and by chance, 
under certain special and unusual circumstances. The condition “quite rarely” 
is expressed through the requirement that the event does not get to be realized 
in the “majority of close possible worlds”. However, from each definition and 
this one as well we expect accuracy when it comes to the given conditions, the 
condition which is already not met when we speak about the “majority of the 
worlds”. Such a blanket approach, unfortunately, creates a problem that we 
cannot allow in a valid definition. We are not able to clearly draw a line be-
tween the contingent events and the ones that are not contingent. The fact that 
D1 gives us an opportunity to recognize a wide class of random events under 
certain circumstances, it is not enough, as we have shown above, for it to be 
declared correct and proper. On the other hand, an attempt to overcome the 
imprecision that exists in D1 by giving it quite precise conditions given by D2 
creates a new problem that is not easily solved without completely destroying 
the mathematical idea of coincidence. The formalism of D2 would have paid 
the price of too wide a definition. This definition would allow us to consider as 
contingent even those events which we intuitively do not accept as such.
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